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First we had market failure; so we tried regulating markets. Then
we had regulatory failure; so we tried reforming regulation. Now, it
seems, we have "reform failure." That, at least, is the message of a
recent book on regulatory reform written by Robert Litan and William
Nordhaus, based on their experience as "watchdogs of the regulatory
process" in President Carter's Council of Economic Advisors.' Re-
forming Federal Regulation argues that, despite its promise, regulation
has failed to cure market failure and that the reforms attempted to date
have failed to cure regulatory failure.
But, say Litan and Nordhaus, there is hope-the reform agenda is
not yet exhausted. The problem with regulatory reformers, like regula-
tors themselves, is the insufficient grandeur of their vision. Regulatory
reform has had too narrow a scope. What is needed, the authors main-
tain, is the establishment of a "centralized process for coordinating reg-
ulation to parallel that of expenditures . ,, Congress must set a
"budget" for all major regulatory activities "so that scarce national re-
sources would be channeled first toward meeting the problems of great-
est importance." 3 Reforming Federal Regulation, then, pushes the visi-
ble-hand logic of regulation to its outermost limit-proposing to subject
the many visible hands of industrial or topical regulation to an omnipo-
t Professor of Law, Boston University. B.A. 1965, Amherst College; LL.B. 1968,
Harvard University.
I R. LITAN & W. NORDHAUS, REFORMING FEDERAL REGULATION 1-2 (1983).
Nordhaus was a member of the Council and Litan served on its staff. Id. at vii. The
CEA was an active participant in the Regulatory Analysis Review Group, created by
President Carter in 1977 to review major regulatory initiatives undertaken by executive
agencies. Id. at 69. The authors summarize the regulatory efforts of the Carter admin-
istration. See id. at 67-78. Litan is now a Washington attorney, and Nordhaus is a
professor of economics at Yale.
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tent paw of centralized regulatory planning. In so doing, the authors
unwittingly lay bare both the irony and, I feel, the poverty of that logic.
I
Litan and Nordhaus make clear at the outset their devotion to the
norm of economic efficiency. The only legitimate role for regulation, as
they see it, is to remedy market failure: "By and large, we do not con-
sider the regulatory system an appropriate tool for income redistribu-
tion . . . .In our view, regulation is appropriately aimed toward cor-
recting inefficient markets rather than rewarding particular groups."4
For this reason, they reject as inherently inefficient most forms of "eco-
nomic regulation," that is, control of prices and market entry, at least
in structurally competitive industries. The "obvious solution" to ineffi-
cient regulation in these sectors, they assert without elaboration, is
"deregulation." 5
Up to this point, Reforming Federal Regulation follows in lock-
step most contemporary regulatory criticism.' But Litan and Nordhaus
break rank with the deregulators when they come to "social regula-
tion," measures designed to correct health, safety, and environmental
side effects or externalities that attend economic activities. Social regu-
lation, they maintain, is "a valuable but easily subverted tool for attain-
ing worthwhile social objectives." 8 It cannot, like most economic regula-
tion, be dismissed out of hand. Rather, it must be "managed to be
effective." 9 The authors attempt to show us how social regulation
should be managed.
The first half of the book is devoted to a demonstration of the need
for management. The authors begin by reviewing the empirical litera-
ture on the impact of regulation. Their admittedly sketchy account con-
cludes that "in certain areas, regulation has produced discernible bene-
fits," 10 but that estimates of the magnitude of those benefits are
extremely sparse and unreliable.1 " Estimates of regulatory costs are
4 Id. at 7.
5 Id. at 6.
' See generally S. BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM (1982); C.
SCHULTZE, THE PUBLIC USE OF PRIVATE INTEREST (1977); M. WEIDENBAUM, Busi-
NESS, GOVERNMENT AND THE PUBLIC (2d ed. 1981).
7 R. LITAN & W. NORDHAUS, supra note 1, at 6. The term is not original with
Litan and Nordhaus. See, e.g., Weaver, Regulation, Social Policy, and Class Conflict,
in REGULATING BUSINESS: THE SEARCH FOR AN OPTIMUM 193 (C. Argyris ed. 1978).
8 R. LITAN & W. NORDHAUS, supra note 1, at 2.
Id.
10 Id. at 16.
I Id. at 14-16.
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more plentiful but still sketchy and elastic.1 2 The data do, however,
convince the authors that regulation has had a significant adverse effect
on the economy, probably accounting for about one-third of a percent-
age point drop in annual productivity gains over the past ten years.13
The authors' principal evidence for the asserted inefficiency of so-
cial regulation is a series of structural arguments, by now so familiar as
to sound hackneyed. Congress creates regulatory programs, not out of a
disinterested desire to achieve efficiency, but in response to the compet-
ing pressures of interest groups motivated by economic or ideological
concerns.14 It entrusts the administration of the programs to "single
mission agencies," often independent of the political branches, 5 and re-
quires those agencies to pursue "unrealistic objectives by constraining
their abilities to balance costs against benefits in making regulatory de-
cisions." ' The agencies then proceed to regulate "narrowly and incre-
mentally"'17 by using a quasi-judicial process of rulemaking1 The
"tunnel vision" resulting from that approach not only prevents agencies
from making efficient tradeoffs among competing goals, but also dis-
tances their decisions from any sources of popular support."'
What, then, is to be done? As Litan and Nordhaus observe, there
is no dearth of proposals for reforming regulation: increased supervi-
sion (by Congress, the executive, or the courts), regulatory analysis
(comparing costs and benefits of regulatory proposals), and deregula-
tion (repealing regulatory statutes, slowing down the issuance of new
rules, relaxing enforcement of existing rules, or reducing agency oper-
ating budgets).20 Conceding that many of these ideas have their attrac-
tions, the authors nonetheless ultimately find them all to be wanting. In
one way or another each suggested reform is too clumsy, incomplete, or
fragmented to fill the need for regulatory "management."2 Only a
comprehensive, centralized process of oversight will do.22
The ideal form of comprehensive oversight, according to the au-
thors, is the "regulatory budget." The regulatory budget is not a new
idea. It has been discussed extensively within the federal govern-
ment-although less so in the published literature-at least since
12 Id. at 32.
13 Id. at 33.
14 Id. at 39-42.
15 Id. at 45-51.
16 Id. at 90.
17 Id. at 54.
18 Id. at 56.
19 Id. at 58.
20 Id. at 100-32.
21 Id. at 108-09, 113, 115-16, 119, 132.
22 Id. at 4.
1984]
1246 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
1978.23 The notion is conceptually simple. Each year Congress would
enact a regulatory budget, setting a ceiling on the costs that regulatory
agencies could impose upon the economy during the upcoming fiscal
year. As with the expenditure budget currently enacted by Congress to
limit direct federal spending, regulatory agencies would have to operate
within their budget ceilings.24 Once agencies reached their limit, they
could take no further actions that added costs to the economy, unless
they obtained an additional appropriation.2 5
The regulatory budget has two principal attractions for Litan and
Nordhaus. First, the process of executive and legislative approval
would assure comprehensive review of the government's regulatory pol-
icy by the politically accountable branches of government.28 Second, by
forcing agencies to make tradeoffs among possible regulatory activities,
the fixed ceilings should induce agencies to choose the most cost-effec-
tive activities.2
Litan and Nordhaus concede that the design of a workable regula-
tory budget requires answers to some difficult questions. What kinds of
regulatory activities-"major" rules, minor rules, orders-should the
budget cover? Should the ceiling be cumulative (covering costs imposed
under old as well as new rules) or prospective (applicable to new rules
only)? How would compliance with the ceilings be monitored and en-
forced? How would regulatory costs be estimated? Who would do it
and at what stage? What would be the procedure for budget prepara-
tion and approval? What entities would be involved? After confronting
these and other challenges,28 the authors conclude that "[i]n our view,
none of the problems. . . is individually great enough to dissuade us of
the desirability of a regulatory budget. But taken together, they are
sufficiently severe to make it unwise to move toward a budget plan in
one leap."29 Instead, as a first step, they propose adoption of a "legis-
lated regulatory calendar" (LRC).30
Under the LRC proposal Congress would enact an annual list or
13 See DeMuth, The Regulatory Budget, REG., Mar.-Apr. 1980, at 29, 30. For
other accounts, see J. ALLEN, THE PROPOSAL FOR A FEDERAL REGULATORY
BUDGET-AN OvERvIEW (Cong. Research Serv., Pub. No. JH 2005 U.S. 1979);
Wood, Laws & Breen, Restraining the Regulators: Legal Perspectives on a Regulatory
Budget for Federal Agencies, 18 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1 (1981).
2' These ceilings might be an aggregate figure for the agency as a whole or sepa-
rate ceilings for each regulatory program.
25 R. LrrAN & W. NORDHAUS, supra note 1, at 134-35.
26 Id. at 139.
27 Id. at 140.
28 Id. at 140-57.
29 Id. at 157.
so Id. at 159.
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"calendar" of the major regulatory initiatives that each agency would
be authorized to undertake during the coming fiscal year. Except in
certain narrowly defined "emergency" cases, no agency would be per-
mitted to promulgate a major rule without prior authorization by way
of its annual calendar or a supplementary calendar. Like any other
legislation, the calendar would be submitted to the President and, once
signed or passed over his veto, would be binding on the agencies. While
the calendar would set no fixed ceiling on regulatory costs, agencies
would be required to prepare preliminary cost and benefit estimates
that would accompany each major rulemaking notice through the re-
view process."1 The visibility of these figures would, Litan and
Nordhaus predict, impose on the two political branches a degree of fis-
cal discipline comparable to that attainable through adoption of a regu-
latory budget.3 2
The LRC avoids the regulatory budget's main stumbling
block-the difficulty of accurately estimating regulatory costs.3" But its
architects confront many of the other design problems presented by the
regulatory budget, plus a few of their own. A major problem is how to
prevent the legislative approval process from getting hopelessly bogged
down in disputes about particular proposed rules. 4 A second involves
defining the extent to which agencies may deviate from their original
(authorized) proposal in adopting a final rule. 5 Once again the authors
grapple candidly and thoughtfully with the various practical objections,
but this time they emerge sufficiently confident of the tractability of the
problems to recommend immediate adoption of the suggested reform.36
II
Reforming Federal Regulation performs a useful service in two
ways. First, it reviews and summarizes much of the burgeoning litera-
ture on regulatory reform in a brief and readable volume. Second, it
makes a serious effort to work out the formidable design problems
presented by the regulatory budget proposal, a proposal that has thus
far been dismissed as impractical. While the ideas of the regulatory
budget and the regulatory calendar are not original, the authors have
given those proposals their fullest development thus far, at least in a
31 Id. at 159-73.
32 Id. at 173-81.
11 Litan and Nordhaus refer to this as the "funny money" problem. See id. at
133.
34 Id. at 163-67.
81 Id. at 168-69.
386 Id. at 181-82.
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widely accessible medium.
The argument constructed by the authors to support their ultimate
recommendations, however, exhibits a number of serious flaws that im-
pair its persuasiveness. One of these flaws is the authors' ambivalence
about the criterion by which to judge regulators' performance. While
economic efficiency is clearly the authors' beacon, a strong democratic
impulse also runs through the book. The authors want regulators to be
politically responsive as well as economically efficient, 37 yet, as they
themselves maintain, the political process often seems deliberately to
adopt inefficient regulatory policies. 8 The authors content themselves
with criticizing regulation as both inefficient and undemocratic, without
squarely confronting the potential for conflict between the two goals.
This may explain the deficiency in the book's discussion of the use
of economic incentives (taxes, fees, or marketable rights) to deal with
the external costs of economic activities. The authors seem to side
squarely with advocates of the "incentives" approach. 9
Yet one can make the case that, under certain circumstances, com-
mand-and-control regulation is theoretically superior to the use of in-
centives. Indeed, a number of social scientists have done so.4" But Litan
and Nordhaus do not even discuss this literature, much less endorse its
findings. Thus, their acceptance of social regulation appears to be based
on its manifest popular (or at least legislative) support.
A second flaw is the book's disconcertingly conclusory style of ar-
gument. The problem with regulation, the reader is repeatedly in-
formed, is its lack of coordination.41 The solution is (voila!) coordina-
tion. But what precisely is coordination, and why is its absence to be
lamented? To a large extent the authors' response to such questions is
to bury them under a barrage of repetitious but non-illuminating asser-
tions. At one point they attempt to justify the need for coordination
with the following generalization: "There is a need in any organization
or society for an oversight mechanism, that is, a process of higher-level
review of the decisions made by individuals and institutions at lower
37 Id. at 102-03 (referring to a need for an institutional mechanism that would
"increase the political accountability of the regulatory agencies").
" See id. at 34, 39. Support for this explanation of regulatory "failure" is legion.
See, e.g., Posner, Taxation by Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. 22 (1971); Stigler, The
Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. EcoN. 3 (1971).
11 R. LrrAN & W. NORDHAUS, supra note 1, at 37-39, 97-98. For a discussion of
the incentives approach, see, e.g., W. BAXTER, PEOPLE OR PENGUINS: THE CASE FOR
OPTIMAL POLLUTION (1974); J. DALES, POLLUTION, PROPERTY AND PRICES (1968);
C. SCHULTZE, supra note 6.
40 See, e.g., White & Wittman, A Comparison of Taxes, Regulation, and Liability
Rules Under Imperfect Information, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 413 (1983).




That plainly will not do. The social institution that the authors
seem most to admire-the market-operates to a large extent without
any coordination or "oversight" mechanism whatever. Admittedly, the
authors do offer less conclusory arguments for regulatory oversight, but
better argument cannot escape the basic contradiction inherent in pro-
posing regulatory solutions to regulatory "failure." In this respect, Re-
forming Federal Regulation typifies much of the recent literature on
regulatory reform. After taking great pains to show that command-and-
control regulation has produced all sorts of perverse results,4 Litan and
Nordhaus recommend as a remedy a new system of command-and-con-
trol' regulation to be applied to the regulators themselves. The danger,
of course, is that the new system of regulation will be plagued by the
same defects to which primary regulation is itself subject.44
III
To understand the irony of Litan and Nordhaus's argument, it is
necessary first to understand what economists mean by regulatory fail-
ure. Regulation is a response to "market failures" such as monopoly,
imperfect information, and externalities.4 As Ronald Coase has shown,
all the conventional categories of "market failure" can be reduced to
"transaction costs"4 -the costs for consumers to gather and assimilate
product safety information, to bribe polluters to reduce emission levels,
or to bribe monopolists to expand output. In other words, economists
use the strikingly peculiar language of "failure" to acknowledge the
reality that obtaining information and negotiating agreements consume
resources. 47 Markets "fail," then, only if (and to the extent that) there
exists some nonmarket mechanism that could reduce transaction costs.
"Regulation" is one plausible candidate in the search for such a
mechanism.
The normative basis for deciding whether to adopt or retain any
particular regulatory program depends on whether the program in-
creases social welfare by lowering transaction costs or by replicating the
effects of market exchanges that might occur only if transaction costs
42 Id. at 60.
43 See id. at 94-96.
44 See generally Goldberg, Institutional Change and the Quasi-Invisible Hand,
17 J.L. & ECON. 461 (1974).
45 R. LITAN & W. NORDHAUS, supra note 1, at 36.
46 Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
47 See generally Calabresi, Transaction Costs, Resource Allocation and Liability
Rules-A Comment, 11 J.L. & ECON. 67 (1968).
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were lower. Positive or descriptive economic theory suggests some plau-
sible reasons why government regulation might economize on the cost of
transactions. Some of the activities involved in market transactions, such
as production and dissemination of information, may be subject to econ-
omies of scale. As a centralized decisionmaker, the government can pre-
sumably realize economies of scale unavailable to individual consumers,
or producers. But scale economies by themselves provide no argument
for governmental intervention. All that is required is a large enough
private producer to realize those same efficiencies. Government's ad-
vantage lies instead in its coercive powers. By using those powers, the
government can overcome difficulties, including the "free rider"
problems, that would plague private efforts to organize consumes or
producers."8
Positive economic theory, however, can equally well be used to
predict that government regulation will not correct market failures.
Regulators have, according to this theory, the same self-seeking motiva-
tions as private producers49 but lack the constraints imposed by compe-
tition. As Litan and Nordhaus themselves argue, "There is no invisible
hand to coordinate activities in the public sector, however; resources
will not be allocated efficiently in the absence of some type of decision-
making apparatus to perform the role that the market assumes in the
private sector." 50 Like private monopolists, regulators will exploit. the
resulting "market power" to maximize such private goals as votes, fu-
ture income, budgets, or prestige.
A vast literature catalogs the forms of behavior said to flow from
the market power of public officials. Legislators vote to authorize pro-
grams in exchange for votes or campaign funds or as a way to generate
future "casework opportunities."51 Legislative districting and voting
rules generate logrolling behavior.52 The high transaction costs of legis-
lating induce legislatures to delegate broad lawmaking authority to ad-
ministrative agencies."3 Agency heads cater to powerful, well-organized
41 See M. OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTrvE ACTION 148-53 (1971).
", See, e.g., Eckert, On the Incentives of Regulators: The Case of Taxicabs, 14
PuB. CHOICE 83, 84-86 (1973); Hilton, The Basic Behavior of Regulatory Commis-
sions, 62 AM. ECON. REv. 47 (1972).
50 R. LITAN & W. NORDHAUS, supra note 1, at 45.
51 Generating casework opportunities refers to the propensity of legislators to vote
to create those programs that will give them an opportunity to intervene on behalf of
their constituents. See, e.g., M. FIORINA, CONGRESS: KEYSTONE OF THE WASHING-
TON ESTABLISHMENT 44-45 (1977); Fiorina & Noll, Voters, Legislators and Bureau-
cracy: Institutional Design in the Public Sector, 68 Am. ECON. REv. 246 (1978).
2 See, e.g., Weingast, Shepsle & Johnsen, The Political Economy of Benefits and
Costs: A Neoclassical Approach to Distributive Politics, 89 J. POL. ECON. 642 (1981).
11 See, e.g., Ehrlich & Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J.
LEGAL STUD. 257, 267-68 (1974).
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constituencies who can deliver present political support or future jobs."
Bureaucrats seek to expand their jurisdictions so as to increase their
budgets.55 Risk-averse rulemakers demand extravagant precautions
against low-probability, high-visibility events and favor easily policed
specification standards over more flexible performance standards.56
Of course, a system in which people behave this way might none-
theless produce efficient outcomes, but it could do so only as a result of
either chance or some mechanism that would serve the same function as
the market's invisible hand. Litan and Nordhaus are understandably
not willing to put their faith in chance, and they flatly deny the exis-
tence of an invisible hand in the public sector.57 Some observers might
be content at this point simply to abandon the idea that regulation can
improve upon the operation of markets. Litan and Nordhaus, however,
are not prepared to give up on regulation. If the problem is the lack of
an invisible hand, they reason, then we must create a visible one. We
must, in other words, regulate the regulators.
The legislated regulatory calendar proposed by Litan and
Nordhaus is a classic example of command-and-control regulation. In-
deed, it bears a striking resemblance to the "antiquated" industry-spe-
cific economic regulatory schemes for which the authors have so few
(and such unkind) words.58 In the legislated regulatory calendar
scheme, members of a regulated industry (regulatory agencies) are for-
bidden to enter a particular line of business (issue a "major" rule)
without obtaining a license (prior legislative approval, memorialized by
inclusion in a legislated regulatory calendar) from a regulatory body
(Congress). If the system works as the authors expect (within a con-
gressional ceiling on the number of major rules to be promulgated), the
regulator will have to make many judgments among numerous applica-
tions, unguided by any articulated selection standards.
Analogies to this system that come readily to mind include broad-
cast licensing by the FCC, airline route awards by the CAB, or carrier
certification by the ICC. The economically perverse results generated
by these discredited regimes certainly do not counsel much optimism
about the LRC. Indeed, the "regulated industry" affected by the LRC
proposal is composed of precisely the same agencies whose regulatory
" See, e.g., M. BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT COMMIS-
SION 88-95 (1955).
" See generally W. NISKANEN, JR., BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE Gov-
ERNMENT 36-42 (1971).
" See, e.g., E. BARDACH & R. KAGAN, GOING BY THE BOOK: THE PROBLEM OF
REGULATORY UNREASONABLENESS (1982).
7 R. LITAN & W. NORDHAUS, supra note 1, at 45.
58 See id. at 6.
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behavior has been so insistently criticized as burdening the economy
with excessively costly rules. And the "regulator" is the same Congress
that a generation of revisionists has accused of deliberately using regu-
lation as an engine for the redistribution of wealth and power in our
society.
Litan and Nordhaus presumably would respond that their propo-
sal does create new institutional actors not present in conventional reg-
ulation-the centralized bodies in the executive and legislative branches
that must review agencies' requests and assemble them into a proposed
calendar. They are probably correct in predicting that these entities,
like their counterparts in the expenditure budget process, will develop
an organizational bias in favor of reducing regulatory costs.5" That is
not, however, necessarily the same as a bias in favor of efficiency. Nor
does that fact alone tell us how much influence these entities will actu-
ally have on legislative outcomes. The experience of centralized con-
gressional budget review since 1974 does not counsel great optimism on
that score. 60
Of course, the principal difference between the LRC and conven-
tional economic regulation is not so much the identity of the players as
the rules of the game. Agencies would be required to justify and Con-
gress to evaluate regulatory policy at a new stage (the notice of pro-
posed rulemaking). The players would follow a new procedure (an an-
nualized authorization) and apply a new criterion for justification
(comparative merit). Arguably, the greater visibility of the process
would impose an efficiency-promoting discipline on both sides, an in-
fluence not present in conventional regulation.6'
But one can just as easily predict the opposite outcome, and for
many of the same reasons that entry regulation has produced such eco-
nomically perverse results in industries like broadcasting and transpor-
tation. Agencies will engage in evasive action to avoid the cost, delay,
and uncertainty of securing a "license" by splitting "major" rules into
smaller ones not subject to the LRC, proceeding by adjudication or
jawboning rather than rulemaking, or by favoring rules with low visi-
ble costs but high secondary costs. Having obtained approval of rela-
tively noncontroversial rules, licensees will exploit congressional inertia
in an effort to obtain drastic modification of those previously approved
5 See id. at 148-49, 177-78.
00 See D. IPPOLITO, CONGRESSIONAL SPENDING: A TWENTIETH CENTURY
FUND REPORT (1981). Ippolito concludes that while the Senate Budget Committee has
been "influential," id. at 103, the House Budget Committee has displayed "relative
weakness," id. at 80. Overall, he asserts that budget centralization in Congress has had
little effect on budget policy or spending levels. Id. at 243-44, 256.
"1 See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
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regulations. The established support for existing programs will create
barriers to entry by newer (and more efficient) programs that must
compete for scarce legislative attention and authorizations.
As the analogy to the expenditure budget reminds us,62 it will be
impossible for Congress to give a full comparative evaluation to the
dozens of proposals it will receive each year. Instead, Congress will
examine closely only a handful of controversial measures, effectively
delegating most of its authority to committees, legislative staff, or the
executive. Lacking the revenue constraint that operates at least loosely
in expenditure budgeting, it may follow the path of least resistance by
including dubious proposals in the calendar. To their credit, Litan and
Nordhaus anticipate many of these objections."3 But they offer no con-
vincing basis for reconciling so rosy a vision of legislative regulation
with so bleak a vision of administrative regulation.
In theory, the regulatory budget escapes many of these criticisms.
It does not rely on classical command-and-control techniques. Indeed, it
most strongly resembles the financial incentive approaches so favored
by economists." The fixed dollar ceiling gives agencies an incentive to
make tradeoffs among potential regulatory projects, favoring those that
promise to have the greatest payoff relative to their costs. By accentuat-
ing the opportunity cost of each rulemaking proceeding-the cost of
promulgating one rule in place of another-the budget forces agencies
to "internalize" regulatory burdens rather than simply impose them
upon others."
Even in theory, however, the regulatory budget falls far short of a
true cost-internalizing incentive scheme like a pollution tax. 6 While to
some extent the budget encourages tradeoffs among regulatory propos-
als, it provides no assurance that agencies will use a currency even re-
motely resembling social benefit to value competing rules. By itself, the
regulatory budget will not alter regulators' intrinsic motivations. They
will presumably continue to value a proposal by its contribution to such
private goals as votes, future income, prestige, or the like. The regula-
tory budget will simply put a cap on the amount of personal "profit"
they can earn. It will enhance social welfare only if the rules scrapped
to fit the budget would have produced less social benefit than cost. But,
given the motivational assumptions underlying most theories of regula-
02 See A. WILDAVSKY, THE POLITICS OF THE BUDGETARY PROCESS 8-16 (1964).
6S See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
See DeMuth, supa note 23, at 30.
65 See R. LITAN & W. NORDHAUS, supra note 1, at 89.
66 See J. DALES, supra note 39, at 81-100.
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tory failure, such a result need not follow.6"
The problems of valuation and enforcement that beset the archi-
tects of incentive schemes6" are especially troublesome in this context.
As Litan and Nordhaus concede, measuring regulatory costs is an ex-
tremely inexact science.6" It is difficult not only to obtain reliable data
on many cost items but also to distinguish effects caused by a particular
rule from those that would have resulted in any event from competitive
pressures, technological developments, or legal changes. Any workable
system of regulatory cost accounting will require drastic simplification.
Litan and Nordhaus favor a prospective budget that sets a ceiling
only on the cost of new rulemakings, a cost estimated once and for all
at the time of promulgation of the rules.70 This expedient greatly
reduces the computational burden of a cumulative budgeting system.
Yet, it introduces enormous difficulties of its own and in fact defeats
some of the benefits of the budget. Estimation of the lifetime costs of a
rule, made six to twenty-four months prior to its issuance and without
benefit of extensive public comment on the rule's actual content, is
hopelessly conjectural. Because regulators will have an incentive to un-
derestimate the costs, some less interested entity will have to review the
estimates. Yet, unless that entity conducts a full-scale review, its esti-
mates will be no more credible than those of the regulators themselves.
A prospective regulatory budget, then, creates ineluctable pressures to
centralize regulatory decisionmaking. It effectively defeats the putative
advantages of decentralized incentive systems, which appeared at first
to be one of the major strengths of the regulatory budget.
The adoption of a prospective approach to regulatory budgeting,
moreover, renders inapt the expenditure budget analogy on which the
authors rely so heavily. A regulatory budget that controls the level of
costs imposed on society over the life of a rule resembles a capital
budget much more closely than an operating budget. Since each year's
regulatory budget would aggregate a group of rules having varying life-
times and temporal cost distributions, the ceiling figure would commu-
nicate little useful information about the absolute magnitude of the reg-
ulatory burden imposed on the economy. Nor could meaningful
comparisons be drawn between the ceiling figures for two adjacent
years. As a consequence, the budget ceilings would lose much of their
87 See supra notes 49-56 and accompanying text.
8 For a discussion of these problems, see Russell, What Can We Get From Efflu-
ent Charges?, 5 POL'Y ANALYSIS 155 (1979); Wenner, Pollution Control: Inplementa-
tion Alternatives, 4 POL'Y ANALYSIS 47 (1978).
11 See R. LITAN & W. NORDHAUS, supra note 1, at 150-52.
70 Id. at 142-43, 145.
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value as a method of disciplining Congress. In addition, the notorious
habit of politicians to mortgage the future would apply to a regulatory
budget as fully as to a capital expenditure budget. Congress would dis-
count future costs at a rate far higher than that set by the economy.7
Finally, some of the same problems of evasion that were evident
with the LRC appear with the regulatory budget. Agencies would be
able to circumvent the regulatory budget by avoiding "major" rulemak-
ings and by favoring plans with low measurable costs but high indirect
costs.
IV
Litan and Nordhaus justly criticize what they call the "lawyer-
regulator's approach" to regulation-the philosophy "which simply or-
ders that which is broken to be fixed .... ,,7' As we have often
learned to our regret, that which appears to be broken is often not
broken at all, or the suggested cure may prove to be worse than the
supposed disease. When Litan and Nordhaus turn from diagnosis to
prescription, however, they fall into the same lawyer-regulator trap
that they criticize. Regulation is broken (fragmented), they say; it must
be fixed (coordinated).
Like the proregulatory zealots who find market failures under
every rock, the authors too readily dismiss the idea that regulatory mar-
kets might be subject to an invisible hand."' As regulation progresses
through cycles of authorization, promulgation, enforcement, and modi-
fication, it affords countless opportunities for interaction through politi-
cal, legal, and bureaucratic processes7 between those who produce and
those who consume regulation. Moreover, by focusing almost exclu-
sively on authorization and rulemaking, Litan and Nordhaus ignore the
important role played by enforcement. Increasingly, students of regula-
tion have observed that the enforcement process serves as a safety valve
to relieve the apparent rigidity of specification standards.
75
71 See Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65,
104 (1983).
72 R. LrrAN & W. NORDHAUS, supra note 1, at 95.
73 For an argument that bureaucracy is subject to internal competitive forces, see
Dobra, Property Rights in Bureaucracies and Bureaucratic Efficiency, 40 PUB.
CHOICE 95 (1983).
74 See generally C. LINDBLOM, THE INTELLIGENCE OF DEMOCRACY: DECISION
MAKING THROUGH MUTUAL ADJUSTMENT (1965).
75 See, e.g., Diver, A Theory of Regulatory Enforcement, 28 PUB. PoL'Y 257, 279
(1980); Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a Market System, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 289
(1983); Veljanovski, Regulatory Enforcement: An Economic Study of the British Factory
Inspectorate, 5 LAw & POL'Y Q. 75 (1983).
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Of course this system does not operate as efficiently as the market
of economists' dreams. Neither do real-world markets. The regulatory
market will theoretically be most influenced by interest groups having
low organization costs and concentrated, high stakes.7" As recent history
demonstrates, however, the regulatory market does not always work in
this fashion and often rewards entrepreneurs skilled at aggregating a
large number of very small claims against the system."' Whatever its
flaws, the regulatory market ought to register reasonably accurately the
magnitude of societal opposition to the costs of health, safety, and envi-
ronmental regulation. For the most part, those costs fall initially on the
business sector, that segment of society most likely to make effective use
of existing political weapons. True, business may take a while to fash-
ion an effective response, but it can, and demonstrably has responded.78
The shift in regulatory policy during the Reagan administration7 9 has
resulted not so much from the creation of new visible-hand institutions,
such as OMB's regulatory review, as from the enhanced political mus-
cle of the businesses on whom regulatory costs have fallen.
Litan and Nordhaus would commit scarce social resources to insti-
tutionalize the political pressures now exerted on the regulatory pro-
cess. They would propel all significant regulatory decisions to the up-
permost level of political action where only the most powerful can play
on any sustained basis. If they are genuinely concerned about effi-
ciency, they should remember the power of marginal analysis. Scarce
analytical, legal, and legislative resources should be expended on regu-
latory rules and programs where they will do the most good, not on the
construction and maintenance of elaborate systemic reforms that are as
likely to kill good projects by delay or inertia as to kill bad projects by
analysis. Public policy is made incrementally, and it will be remade or
unmade incrementally as well.
71 See, e.g., R. NOLL, REFORMING REGULATION: AN EVALUATION OF THE ASH
COUNCIL PROPOSALS 39-42 (1971).
7 See Wilson, The Politics of Regulation, in THE POLITICS OF REGULATION 369
(J. Wilson ed. 1980).
71 According to a recent survey of 400 business firms, there has been a substantial
increase in the level of business lobbying during the past decade. See PUBLIC AFFAIRS
RESEARCH GROUP, BOSTON UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT, PUBLIC AF-
FAIRS OFFICERS AND THEIR FUNCTIONS, SUMMARY OF SURVEY RESPONSES 7-9, 11
(1981) (34% of Washington offices and 94% of corporate political action committees
established during the period 1975-1979). The reporting companies expressed overall
satisfaction with their degree of influence in federal policymaking. See id. at 12 (80%
describing their Washington presence as at least "moderately" effective at influencing
legislation and representing the company's interests before rulemaking agencies).
1 See R. LITAN & W. NORDHAUS, supra note 1, at 119-32.
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